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DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND 
THE "LANGUAGES OF PERSONAL RESONANCE" 
THE WORK OF CHARLES TAYLOR AS A RESOURCE 
FOR SPIRITUALITY IN AN ERA OF POST-MODERNITY 
The focal text for this essay is the final chapter of Charles Taylor's 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, which he has 
titled "The Conflicts of Modernity" (Chapter 25). I shall argue that this 
chapter, in ways that are at once provocative and richly allusive - yet 
also fragmentary and frustratingly elusive - has embedded within it 
resources for a spirituality appropriate to a culture standing on the cusp 
between modernity and post-modernity. 
The confines of this essay do not allow rehearsing the full scope of the 
arguments constructed throughout Sources of the Self by which Taylor 
reaches the most encompassing of the conclusions about "the making of 
the modem identity" enunciated in this chapter. I thus simply take as a 
given starting point the reliability of the account he offers of "the mod-
em self" and of the polarities that emerged in the long historical process 
of its construction - polarities that have more recently been named, dis-
sected and dismantled by various forms of post-modernism. These polar-
ities arise within and across the elements of the modem "sense of self" 
that Taylor takes to be "defined by the powers of disengaged reason as 
well as of the creative imagination, in the characteristically modem under-
standings of freedom and dignity and rights, in the ideals of self-fulfilment 
and expression and in the demands of universal benevolence and jus-
tice"l. These polarities, moreover, pose in concert a serious challenge to 
the very possibility of construing the spiritual as a constitutive element 
of the deepest part of our reality as human and thereby rule out spiritu-
ality as an intelligible form of human activity. 
In order to uncover the resources that Taylor's work provides for spir-
ituality in a post-modem age, it will be, useful to start with an examina-
tion of the strategy he proposes for addressing the most intractable of the 
1. C. TAYLOR, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 503. 
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polarities he diagnoses in the dynamics of the modem self. He fonnulates 
this polarity as "the general truth that the highest spiritual ideals and aspi-
rations also threaten to lay the most crushing burdens on humankind" and 
then observes that "[t]he great spiritual visions of human history have also 
been poisoned chalices, the causes of untold misery and even savagery"2. 
Behind his remarks is an earlier discussion (Chapter 3) of "hypergoods" 
i.e., "goods which not only are incomparably more important than oth-
ers but provide the standpoint from which these [other goods] must be 
weighed, judged, decided about"3. Taylor argues that the naturalist ten-
dencies of modem moral theory - which rule hypergoods out of their 
explicit accounts of moral justification - have thereby occluded the "qual-
itative difference" so "central to much of our moral life, [namely] that 
something incomparably important is involved" in our moral conducfl. 
Although Taylor is well aware that many factors have played a role in 
such discrediting of hypergoods and the qualitative differences they indi-
cate, he is most interested in bringing to the foreground the moral con-
cerns that, even as they have fueled the engine of this naturalist critique, 
have themselves become opaque in consequence of that critique. 
The most prominent of these moral concerns cluster around the percep-
tion that, however noble the ideals that hypergoods inspire, they also have 
enonnous power to distort, dominate and crush. Taking cognizance of • 
more recent manifestations of that concern, such as Foucault's insight 
into "the ways in which high ethical and spiritual ideas are often inter-
woven with exclusions and relations of domination" and the feminist cri-
tique "that certain conceptions of the life of the spirit exclude women, 
accord them a lesser place, or assume their subordination", Taylor then 
observes: "The sense that in this and other ways hypergoods can stifle 
or oppress us has been one of the motives for the naturalist revolt against 
traditional morality and religion"5. 
As Taylor sees it, this revolt has not been without its own price - espe-
cially in view of the fact that the twentieth century has shown that reli-
gion has no monopoly on the destructive power of hypergoods: 
"The Kharkov famine and the Killing Fields were perpetrated by athe-
ists in an attempt to realize the most lofty ideals of human perfection"6. 
In the face of such destruction, a "sober, scientific minded secular human-
ism" takes the polarity embedded within hypergoods as a dilemma that 
2. Ibid., p. 519. 
3. Ibid., p. 63. 
4. Ibid., p. 87. 
5. Ibid., pp. 518-519. 
6. Ibid., p. 519. 
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is inescapable. It therefore advises the "prudent strategy" of managing the 
dilemma "by stifling the response in us to some of the deeper and most 
powerful spiritual aspirations that human beings have conceived"7. It is 
a strategy of self-induced amnesia of the spiritual in the name of getting 
on with life8• Although Taylor acknowledges that this strategy may very 
well be "a good way to live with the dilemma", he also quite cuttingly 
characterizes the choice it presents us with as one "between various kinds 
of spiritual lobotomy and self-inflicted wounds"9. 
This strategy simply will not do because Taylor does not consider the 
dilemma that "a stripped down secular outlook" perceives within moral 
perspectives framed by hypergoods to be an inescapable one. He does not 
take it to be the case that "that the highest spiritual aspirations must lead 
to mutilation or destruction" 10. Even in the aftermath of modernity, he 
contends, we can rightly and coherently affIrm our human possibilities in 
terms of such aspirations - but only to the extent we can legitimately 
articulate them by reference to a hope of the kind that is instanced (though 
not exclusively) in "Judeo-Christian theism and in its central promise of 
a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain 
unaided"ll. In this chapter Taylor thus connects his earlier analyses of the 
"inarticulacy" of moral life lived in accord with the ideals and demands 
of modernity to the claims he now sketches that the moral sources 
empowering the highest human spiritual aspirations can be articulated 
most adequately from "a certain theistic perspective"12. These connec-
tions could be rendered, I believe, into a intriguing variant of a "moral 
argument" for God - but as challenging as that line of inquiry would be, 
it is not my focus here. 
I am more concerned, instead, with exploring and understanding the 
proposal he sketches for removing our "selective blindness" about the 
goods that would fully empower the human spirit, and thereby restoring 
our articulacy about them - as well as our articulacy about our human-
ity as itself spiritual in its constitutive reality. This proposal instances 
the intent with which he has shaped the trajectory of Sources of the Self 
to be a work that is not mere diagnosis but also an aid to "liberation" 
7. Ibid., p. 519. 
8. For a more extensive treatment of this, see P. ROSSI, The Leveling of Meaning: 
Christian Ethics in the Face of a Culture of Unconcern, in J. RUNZO - N. MARTIN (eds.), 
Ethics in the World Religions, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2001, pp. 161-174. 
9. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 520. 
10. Ibid., p. 520-521. 
11. Ibid., p. 521 
12. Ibid., p. 518. 
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from ways that "we tend in our culture to stifle the spirit"13. The path 
that he charts to such liberation lies through the devising of "new lan-
guages of personal res~nance to make crucial human goods alive for us 
again"14. This kind of language is needed, he claims, "because we are 
now in an age in which a publicly accessible order of cosmic meanings 
is an impossibility. The only way we can explore the order in which we 
are set with an aim to defining moral sources is through this part of per-
sonal resonance" 15. 
The phrase "new languages of personal resonance" is certainly apt 
rhetorically in that it indicates the need for a new form of articulacy about 
matters of the [human] spirit that "have been read out of our official 
story". Yet, to the extent that it also suggests that such new articulacy 
issues primarily from the very kind of "inwardness" of the self that has 
been deconstructed in post-modernist critiques, it seems also problematic 
with respect to the central issues it is supposed to address. The proximate 
origin of this notion of "languages of personal resonance" lies in what 
Taylor terms the "expressivist" strand of 19th and 20th century art and lit-
erature. He is well aware that a crucial issue with respect to such "lan-
guages" - and, a fortiori to his proposal that they are important to the 
recovery of the spiritual in human life - is that they are vulnerable to the 
same charges of subjectivism that he would himself acknowledge are 
often legitimately leveled against the expressivist movements that first 
articulated them. Put in terms of our conference theme of "Theology and 
Conversation", the issue is whether such "languages" must remain 
trapped by origins that stamp them in some indelible fashion with a mono-
logical character - or can they, instead, function as modes of genuine 
conversation engaging selves with other selves who stand in a social 
wholeness that is itself referred to a transcendent divine Other. While 
Taylor implies that "languages of personal resonance" can function con-
versationally, he does not mount a full scale argument to show this - and 
so is my hope that the rest of this essay can provide at least an initial 
sketch of three of the important elements that are needed to mount such 
an argument. 
The first important element needed to move these suggestive claims 
about the languages of personal resonance to a more clearly delineated 
13. Ibid., p. 520. "The intention of this work was one of retrieval, an attempt to recover 
buried goods through rearticulation - and thereby to make those sources again empower, 
to bring the air back again into the half collapsed lungs of the spirit". 
14. Ibid., p. 513. 
15. Ibid., p. 512. 
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\. argument justifying their role in liberating us from the self-stifling of the 
spirit is, at best, only partially given in Sources of the Self. Moreover, 
•. because it is given quite early on (Chapter 2), it is quite easy to overlook 
as an operative element in the claims set forth in the concluding chapter. 
This element is one that Taylor terms "the transcendental condition of 
interlocution"16. It inescapably links a self's identity - of which a fun-
damental function for Taylor is a self-interpretation that operates in a 
"space" of meaning and value - to "a defining community" in terms of 
"webs of interlocution"17. Taylor puts this conversational locus for a 
self's identity in forceful terms: 
... My self defInition is understood as an answer to the question Who am 
I. And this question fmds its original sense in the interchange of speakers. 
I defme who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in 
social space, in the geography of social statuses and functions, in my inti-
mate relations to the ones I love, and also crucially in the space of moral 
and spiritual orientation within which my most important defining relations 
are lived out. 
This obviously cannot be a contingent matter. There is no way we could be 
inducted into personhood except by being initiated into a language. We fIrst 
learn our languages of moral and spiritual discernment by being brought 
into an ongoing conversation by those who bring us Up18. (Emphasis added) 
"Languages of personal resonance" thus need to be understood to stand 
within this transcendental condition of interlocution, not as an exception 
to it. Placed within this condition, their origin from the "inwardness" of 
particular human individuals does not render them ineluctably monolog-
ical; on the contrary, it orders them to the conversational. 
Taylor's placement of these languages under the condition of "inter-
locution", however, may seem to many to be an obiter dicta that stands 
in tension with what is often taken to be the trajectory of the history 
from which "expressivist" understandings of the human person have 
emerged. According to this version of that history, the strands of sci-
ence, literature, art and philosophy that weave into modern notions of 
16. Ibid., p. 39. Taylor's frames this understanding of the self in terms of self-
interpretation - and the related categories of meaning and strong evaluation - to be a pro-
grammatic counterweight to naturalist accounts of the human Le., those that model the 
study of the human on the natural sciences. He gives an overview of this program in the 
introductions to Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1985 and Philosophy & the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, a collection of essays published 
prior to Sources of the Self. 
17. Ibid., p. 36. 
18. Ibid., p. 35. 
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the self have made it possible to deny that selves stand under the neces-
sity of the condition of interlocution. Taylor describes this view quite 
pointedly: 
Modem culture has developed conceptions of individualism which picture 
the human person as, at least potentially, rmding his or her own bearings 
within, declaring independence from the web of interlocution which have 
originally formed him/her, or at least neutralizing them. It's as though the 
dimension of interlocution were of significance only for the genesis of indi-
viduality, like the training wheels of nursery school, to be left behind and 
to play no part in the finished person19• 
Not surprisingly, Taylor views such a monological rendering of the 
self's identity to be incoherent - as well as dangerous. At the same time, 
however, he is very much aware that "there is a common picture of the 
self, as (at least potentially and ideally) drawing its purposes, goals and 
life-plans out of itself, seeking 'relationships' only insofar as they are 
'fulfilling"', and that this picture manifests the "hold of certain deeply 
entrenched modes of thought in modern culture"20. When understood as 
part of this picture, languages of personal resonance would indeed seem 
to be nothing but monological; but this conclusion goes counter to a key 
aspect ofthe "liberation" envisioned in Sources of the Self to be effected 
- at least in part - through languages of personal resonance, viz., loosen-
ing the hold this very picture of the monological self has upon the thought 
and imagination of modern culture. On Taylor's account, the monologi-
cal self neither historically nor conceptually arises primarily in conse-
quence of expressivist understandings of the human person; rather, those 
understandings have themselves been swept up into a monological tra-
jectory that seeks to strip them away from any condition of interlocution. 
Accounting for the grip that such a monological view has had upon 
modern thought is thus essential to the liberation Taylor hopes to effect 
in Sources of the Self. The account he gives, moreover, indicates that 
opposition to monological theories of language was itself fundamental to 
the historical origins of expressivism. As noted at the outset, retelling 
that account in all its complex historical and conceptual detail is not 
within the purview of this essay. I shall only attempt here to identify two 
elements in that account that I believe - in addition to his claim about the 
transcendental condition of interlocution - are needed to construct an 
argument on behalf of the conversational function of languages of per-
sonal resonance for "bring[ing] air back again into the half-collapsed 
19. Ibid., p. 36. 
20. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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lungs of the spirit"21. The remainder of this essay will thus bring these 
two elements into focus and indicate their importance for that argument. 
-; One element arises from Taylor's analysis of the problematic charac-
ter of designative accounts of language and meaning that he sees arising 
in connection with the seventeenth century scientific revolution. These 
accounts played a key role in "[t]he philosophies of the seventeenth cen-
tury [that] remade our conceptions of man, thought and knowledge to fit 
the new [scientific] dispensation"22. He alludes to this in his discussion 
of the transcendental condition of interlocution when he notes that "the 
early modern theories of language, from Hobbes through Locke to 
Condillac, presented it as an instrument potentially inventable by indi-
viduals"23. He does not, however, elaborate any further on this in Sources 
o/the Self; he instead makes reference to an earlier essay, "Language and 
Human Nature", in which he analyses and criticizes those theories in the 
light of an alternate account, originating with Herder, according to which 
"language is not just a set of words which designate things; it is the vehi-
cle of this kind of reflective awareness. This reflection is a capacity which 
we only realize in speech"24. He then expands this remark along the fol-
lowing lines: 
What, then does language come to be on this view? A pattern of activity by 
which we express/realize a certain way of being in the world, that of reflec-
tive awareness but a pattern which can only be deployed only against a 
background we can never fully dominate; yet a background that we are 
never fully dominated by, since we are constantly reshaping it. Reshaping 
it without dominating it, or being able to oversee it, means that we never 
fully know what we are doing to it ... 
... If language serves to express/realize a new kind of awareness; then it 
may not only make possible a new awareness of things, an ability to describe 
them; but also new ways of feeling, of responding to things. If in express-
ing our thoughts about things we can come to new thoughts, then in express-
ing our feelings we can come to have transformed feelings25. 
Taylor sees Herder's expressivist understanding of language helping to 
launch a trajectory for understandings of the self that, even as they value 
21. Ibid., p. 520. 
22. TAYLOR, Language and Human Nature, in m., Human Agency (n. 16), p. 224. 
23. ID., Sources (n. 1), p. 38. 
24. m., Language (n. 22), pp. 228-229. Also relevant are his essays, Theories of Mean-
ing, in TAYLOR, Human Agency (n. 16), pp. 248-292 and The Importance of Herder, in 
TAYLOR, Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 79-99. 
In the latter he notes (p. 92) that for Herder" expression constitutes the linguistic dimen-
sion" and "language comes about as a new reflective stance toward things" (emphases 
added). 
25. TAYLOR, Language (n. 22), pp. 232-233; he reiterates this in The Importance of 
Herder (n. 24), p. 97. 
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"inwardness", move in directions quite counter to a monological sub-
jective individualism. These expressivist understandings are anti-subjec-
tivist inasmuch as their "inwardness" provides a route of access for locat-
ing the self within a web of meaning that is larger than the self. ill "the 
epiphanies of modernism", whIch Taylor references to writers such as 
Rilke, Joyce, Mann, and Wallace Stevens, he finds a "multilevelled con-
sciousness [that] is thus frequently 'decentered'; aware of living on a 
transpersonal rhythm which is mutually irreducible to the personal"26. 
Taylor thus finds that these forms of expressivist understanding hold 
forth possibilities for an "interweaving of the subjective and the tran-
scendent"27. Such interweaving can then provide a basis on which to 
shape a spirituality appropriate to the human circumstances that Taylor 
describes as facing us in consequence of the polarities of modernity. This 
possibility - and the spirituality it can engender - may appear quite sur-
prising if the origins of expressivist accounts of language and meaning 
are seen, as they most often are, in terms of a history of the inexorable 
progress of the forces of secularization. Taylor, however, vigorously con-
tests this telling of history in Sources of the Self and suggests, in its stead, 
that we read the development of expressivist understandings of language, 
meaning, and self against the background of the Christian doctrines of 
creation and of grace. The link that Taylor makes between an expres-
sivist account of language and the Christian doctrines of creation and 
transfiguring grace is the third element that I think needs to enter into the 
construction of an argument showing how "languages of personal reso-
nance" can function conversationally to "bring air back again into the 
half-collapsed lungs of the spirit". 
Taylor finds this link in the history he recounts of the modem pre-
occupation with language. Behind designative theories of meaning lies the 
medieval nominalisms that rejected an ontology that had an expressivist 
theory of meaning embedded in it: this, however, was not a theory of 
human but of the divine language: 
... Just as our thought is clothed externally in our words, so is the thought 1 
of God, the Logos - the Verbum for Augustine - deployed externally in the j 
creation. This is, as it were, God's speech ...1 
. .. the paradigm and model of our deploying signs is God's creation. 1 
But now God's creation is to be understood expressively. His creatures man-
ifest his logos in embodying it; and they manifest the logos as fully as it can 
be manifest in the creaturely medium ... 28. 
26. ID., Sources (n. 1), p. 48l. 
27. Ibid., p. 493. 
28. TAYLOR, Language (n. 22), p. 223. 
' .. 
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Human language thus is secondary in this account, and Taylor 
acknowledges that the nominalist rejection of this "discourse-thought 
model of the real" gave human language a far more central role. That 
role, however, is one of 
... an instrument of control in the assemblage of ideas which is thought or 
mental discourse. It is an instrument of control in gaining knowledge of the 
world as objective process. And so it must itself be perfectly transparent; it 
cannot itself be the locus of mystery, that is of anything which might be irre-
ducible to objectivity ... 
... the alternative is to lose control, to slip into a kind of slavery; where it is 
no longer I who make my lexicon, by defmitional fiat, but rather it takes 
shape independently and in doing shapes my thought. It is an alienation of my 
freedom as well as the great source of illusion; and this is why the men of 
this age combated the cosmos of meaningful order with such determination29• 
In this context, Herder's challenge to a designative account continued 
to see human language as central but offered a strikingly different under-
standing of its role: "language is not just a set of words which designate 
things; it is the vehicle of ... reflective awareness"30. 
Herder thus reinstates the earlier expressivist theory, but as a theory of 
language, rather than of the cosmos. According to Taylor, Herder and other 
expressivist theorists "transposed what belongs to God on this older the-
ory on to man. For man like God embodies his ideas and makes them 
manifest. But unlike God, man needs his expression to make his ideas 
manifest ... his ideas do not properly exist before their expression in lan-
guage or some other of the media men deploy"3l. Taylor is aware, of 
course, that this transposition of expressive power from the creative activ-
ity of God to the articulations of meaning in human language has taken tra-
jectories along which lie the displacement of God - be it terms of an 
explicit atheistic denial of God or a pantheistic collapse of the difference 
between God and the world. While the credibility of the latter - at least in 
the form that Taylor terms the "too indulgent pantheism" of Romanti-
cism - has receded, Taylor does not think that we must inevitably be drawn 
along the atheistic trajectory. There is a choice: 
Is the expression which makes us human essentially a self-expression, in that 
we are mainly responding to our way of feeling/responding the world, and 
bringing this to expression? Or are we responding to the reality in which we 
are set, in which we are included, of course, but which is not reducible to our 
experience of it32 ? 
29. Ibid., p. 226. 
30. Ibid., pp. 228-229. 
31. Ibid., p. 229. 
32. Ibid., p. 239. 
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Using language he will later echo in Sources of the Self when describ-
ing moral sources as "something the love of which empowers us to be 
and do good" 33 , Taylor sides with a choice for the latter: 
Some contemporaries would argue that the most expressive creations, hence 
those where we are closest to deploying our expressive power at the fullest, 
are not self expressions; that they rather have the power to move us because 
they manifest our expressive power itself and its relation to the world. In this 
kind of expression we are responding to the way things are, rather than just 
exteriorizing our feelings34. 
There is a further connection Taylor makes between a Christian under-
standing of creation and this capacity of such expressive power to move 
us to be and to do good that has a bearing upon the function of "lan-
guages of personal resonance". He makes this connection in terms of the 
affirmation of the goodness of creation. 
Taylor claims that "a stark rejection of any spiritual dimension may 
easily engender a sense that the affirmation [of the goodness of nature] 
is insufficiently based, that there isn't much to affirm at all"35. In such a 
context, Taylor thinks it is necessary, even for those within a Christian 
theological "tradition [of] affmning the goodness of nature ... to fmd new 
languages to say what they wanted to say"36 in this affmnation. He fmds 
resources for such a new languages in the expressivist tradition, particu- '. 
larly as it understands such affmnation to involve "a transfiguration of 
our own vision, rather than simply ... a recognition of some objective 
order of goodness ... it may have to take the form of a transformation of 
our stance toward the world and self, rather than simply the registering of 
external reality"37. In his account of such transformation, moreover, Taylor 
portrays it in terms of a link between creation and grace: 
What we have in this new issue of affIrming the goodness of things is the 
development of a human analogue to God's seeing things as good: a see-
ing which also helps effect what it sees. This can mean, of course, that the 
self-attribution of this power is a resolutely atheist doctrine, the arrogation 
to man of powers formerly confmed to God. This will be so with Nietzsche 
... But this doesn't have to be so. One of the most insightful thinkers to 
explore this power is Dostoyevsky, who sees it in a Christian perspective. 
In fact the notion of a transformation of our stance towards the world 
whereby our vision is changed has traditionally been connected with the 
notion of grace. Augustine holds that in relation to God, love has to precede 
33. TAYLOR, Sources (n. 1), p. 93. 
34. ID., Language (n. 22), p. 239. 
35. ID., Sources (n. 1), p. 448. 
36. Ibid., p. 446. 
37. Ibid., p. 448. 
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knowledge. With the right direction of love, things become evident which 
are hidden otherwise. What is new is the modern sense of the place and 
power of the creative imagination. This is now an integral part of the good-
ness of things, and hence the transformation of our stance and thus our out-
look helps bring about the truth it reveals38• 
The mention of Augustine is not a mere passing remark, inasmuch 
as Taylor had earlier characterized "the expressivist revolution" as 
"a prodigious development of modern post-Augustinian inwardness in its 
self-exploratory branch"39. That development, however, has been one in 
which a fundamental Augustinian trajectory has been rendered prob-
lematic. In an age of post-modernity it cannot be taken for granted that 
exploration of "inner" will take a path by which we are also - be it by 
a Platonic attraction to the good or by the irresistibility of grace - drawn 
to the "higher". At the same time, Taylor claims that, in circumstances 
in which "a publicly accessible order of cosmic meanings is an impos-
sibility", such an exploration of inwardness is needed to make it possi-
ble for us to have access to very goods that have been occluded by 
modernity. 
In consequence, in order to make "languages of personal resonance" 
, a fundamental resource for spirituality, ways must be found to restore 
credibility to the Augustinian trajectory that draws us to the higher along 
the path of the inner. How might this be done? I believe that Taylor pro-
vides at least two clues for this: the fust is in his identification of the 
kinds of goods to which he thinks we have access primarily "through 
personal sensibility ... for instance, why it matters and what it means to 
have a more resonant human environment, and even more, to have affil-
iations with some depth in time and commitment"40; the second is in a 
remark he makes about Dostoyevsky, who "brings together a central idea 
of the Christian tradition, especially evident in the Gospel of John, that 
people are transformed through being loved by God, a love that they 
mediate to each other, on one hand, with the modern notion of a subject 
who can help to bring on transfiguration by the stance he takes to him-
self and the world, on the other"41. As I read these remarks - particularly 
in the light of the important connections that I see them affrrming between 
creation and grace - they suggest a spirituality in which "personal reso-
nance" is attuned with and to "a demand that our natural surrounding 
38. Ibid" p. 449. 
39. Ibid., p. 389. 
40. Ibid" p. 513. 
41. Ibid" p. 452. 
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and wilderness make on us "42 and also with and to the most abiding affil-
iative relationship to which we have been granted graced access - the 
trinitarian dynamic of God's own life. As a Jesuit, I cannot help but think-
ing that what Taylor allusively suggests can be placed in continuity with 
the spirituality of the Spiritual Exercises with its attentiveness to the inner 
movement of God's grace in the individual and its deep rooting in the the-
ology of Creation and the Trinity - but that is work for another essay. 
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